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Abstract
Weighted voting games provide a popular model of decision making in
multiagent systems. Such games are described by a set of players, a list of
players’ weights, and a quota; a coalition of the players is said to be win-
ning if the total weight of its members meets or exceeds the quota. The
power of a player in such games is traditionally identiﬁed with her Shapley–
Shubik index or her Banzhaf index, two classical power measures that reﬂect
the player’s marginal contributions under different coalition formation sce-
narios. In this paper, we investigate by how much the central authority can
change a player’s power, as measured by these indices, by modifying the
quota. We provide tight upper and lower bounds on the changes in the indi-
vidual player’s power that can result from a change in quota. We also study
how the choice of quota can affect the relative power of the players. From
the algorithmic perspective, we provide an efﬁcient algorithm for determin-
ing whether there is a value of the quota that makes a given player a dummy,
i.e., reduces his power (as measured by both indices) to 0. On the other hand,
we show that checking which of the two values of the quota makes this player
more powerful is computationally hard, namely, complete for the complexity
class PP, which is believed to be signiﬁcantly more powerful than NP.
1 Introduction
Cooperation and joint decision-making are key aspects of many interactions among
self-interested agents. The collaborating agents may have different preferences, so
they need a method to agree on a common course of action. One possible solution
to this problem is to use a (weighted) voting procedure. Under such a procedure,
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1each agent is assigned a numerical weight, and a coalition is deemed to be winning
if its total weight exceeds a given quota.
An important issue in weighted voting is how to measure the power of each
voter, i.e., her ability to affect the ﬁnal outcome. In particular, this question is criti-
cal when the agents have to decide how to distribute the payoffs resulting from their
joint action: A natural approach is to pay each agent according to his contribution,
i.e., his voting power.
An agent’s ability to affect the result of the game is not always directly propor-
tionaltoherweight. Forexample, inagamewherethequotaissohighthattheonly
winning coalition is the one that involves all agents, each agent can veto the deci-
sion, and hence all agents have equal power. Thus, to measure the power, instead
of using agents’ weights, one typically employs one of the so-called power index
functions. Perhaps the most prominent ones are the Shapley–Shubik index [20]
and the Banzhaf index [8, 4]. Intuitively, they both measure the probability that a
given agent is critical to a forming coalition, i.e., that the coalition would become
winning if the agent joined in. The difference between these two power indices
comes from different coalition formation models.
The value of an agent’s power index reﬂects his ability to affect the outcome
and may determine his payoffs. Therefore, selﬁsh agents may try to increase their
power, as measured by these power indices, by employing some form of manipu-
lative behavior, such as, e.g., splitting their weight between several identities; this
form of manipulation was recently studied in [1]. Similarly, the central authority,
may want to minimize or maximize the inﬂuence of a particular agent by modify-
ing the rules of the game, e.g., by changing the quota. The goal of this paper is
to study the effects on the agents’ power caused by a malicious central authority.1
Plausible goals for the center include maximizing or minimizing a given player’s
power-index value (in particular, making a given player a dummy, i.e., reducing her
power to 0), or ensuring that all players have different power-index values (or, on
a more local scale, ensuring that two given players have either different or equal
power-index values). In this paper, we study these issues from both the worst-case
and the algorithmic perspective. We give matching upper and lower bounds on
the worst-case relative and absolute effects that a change of the quota may have
on a given player’s power. As in several applications the ranking of the agents is
more important than the exact power they possess, we also study the problem of
setting the quota so as to guarantee a particular relation (equality or inequality)
between two players’ power-index values. A related issue that we consider is that
1In voting theory literature, dishonest behavior by the central authority is usually referred to as
“control”, while the term “manipulation” is reserved for voters’ dishonest behavior. However, in this
paper we will use both terms interchangeably.
2of selecting the quota value to ensure that all players with different weights have
different power-index values. Finally, we investigate the quota manipulation prob-
lem from computational perspective. We describe a polynomial-time algorithm for
testing whether there is a quota value that makes a given player a dummy, and we
show that the problem of deciding which of the two quotas is better for a particu-
lar player is complete for the complexity class PP, which is believed to be more
powerful than NP.
Related work The Shapley value originated in a seminal paper [19] which consid-
ered how to fairly allocate the utility gained by the grand coalition in cooperative
games. A subsequent paper [20] applies the Shapley value to weighted voting
games, so this value is referred to as the Shapley–Shubik power index in this con-
text. A ﬁrst version of the Banzhaf power index was introduced in [4]; a more
natural deﬁnition was later proposed in [8]. Both power indices have been well
studied [18]. Their practical applications include analyzing the voting structures
of the European Union Council of Ministers and the IMF [14, 13]. Computational
complexity of power indices is also quite well understood: while computing both
indices is #P-complete [12, 17], they can be computed in polynomial time when all
weights are at most polynomial in the number of players [15], and several papers
(e.g., [11, 2]) discuss ways to approximate them. Some of these algorithms work
well in practice and thus justify the use of power indices as payoff distribution
schemes.
Computational aspects of various forms of dishonest behavior in voting with m
alternatives received a lot of attention in recent years [9]. Speciﬁcally, this research
considers manipulation (dishonest behavior by voters), control (dishonest behavior
by the election authority), and bribery (dishonest behavior by an outside party).
This stream of work, and, in particular, the papers devoted to control, provides
motivation for our research, but results for the model with m alternatives cannot
be directly applied to our setting. Several papers deal with manipulations aimed
at increasing the Shapley value of an agent in various domains [6, 21]. Perhaps
the closest in spirit to our work is [1], which considers manipulation by voters in
weighted voting games. However, to the best of our knowledge, manipulation by
the center in the context of weighted voting games has not been studied before.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
Weighted Voting Games A weighted voting game G = [I;w;q] is given by a set
of players I = f1;:::;ng, a vector of players’ weights w = (w1;:::;wn) and a
quota q. A coalition is a subset of players J  I. A coalition J is winning if its
total weight meets or exceeds the quota, i.e.,
P
j2J wj  q and is losing otherwise.
3We write v(J) = 1 if J wins and v(J) = 0 if J loses. We say that an agent
i 2 J is pivotal to coalition J if v(J) = 1 and v(J n fig) = 0; similarly, i
contributes to J if v(J) = 0, v(J [ fig) = 1. A player i is called a dummy if he
does not contribute to any coalition, i.e., for any J  I we have v(J[fig) = v(J).
We denote by w(J) the total weight of a coalition J, i.e., w(J) =
P
i2J wi. For
the purposes of this paper, we can assume without loss of generality that 0 < w1 
  wn and that 0 < q  w(I). Therefore, we will make these assumptions
throughout the paper, unless explicitly speciﬁed otherwise.
Shapley–ShubikIndexandBanzhafIndexBothShapley–ShubikindexandBanzhaf
index measure an agent’s marginal contribution to possible coalitions. However,
they differ in the underlying coalition formation scenarios: while the Shapley–
Shubik index implicitly assumes that the agents join a coalition in random order,
the Banzhaf index is based on the assumption that each agent decides whether to
join a coalition independently at random. Both of these measures can be deﬁned
for a much larger class of games than weighted voting games. However, in what
follows we provide deﬁnitions that are specialized to our scenario.
Let  be the set of all one-to-one mapping from I to I; an element of  is
denoted by . Set S(i) = fj j (j) < (i)g: the set S(i) consists of all
predecessors of i in . The Shapley–Shubik index of the ith agent in a game G =
[I;w;q] is denoted by 'i(G) and is given by the following expression:
'i(G) =
1
n!
X
2
[v(S(i) [ fig)   v(S(i))]: (1)
In words, the Shapley-Shubik power index counts the fraction of all orderings of
the agents in which agent i is pivotal for the coalition formed by his predecessors
and himself. We will occasionally abuse notation and say that an agent i is pivotal
for a permutation  if it is pivotal for the coalition S(i) [ fig.
The Banzhaf index i(G) of an agent i in a game G = [I;w;q] is computed as
follows:
i(G) =
1
2n 1
X
S:i62S
[v(S [ fig)   v(S)]: (2)
This index simply counts the number of coalitions for which agent i is pivotal.
Both of these indices have several useful properties that make them very con-
venient to work with. In particular, both of them have the dummy player property,
which states that the value of the index for a given player is 0 if and only if he does
not contribute to any coalition, and the symmetry property, which states that if two
players have equal weights, then their indices are equal. Also, Shapley–Shubik
index (but not the Banzhaf index) has the normalization property, which claims
4that the sum of Shapley–Shubik indices of all players is equal to 1. All of these
properties are easy to verify from the deﬁnitions.
To simplify notation, given a game G = [I;w;q], we will sometimes write
'i(q) and i(q) instead of 'i(G) and i(G) if I and w are clear from the context.
3 Upper and Lower Bounds for a Single Player
We will start this section by showing that the center can signiﬁcantly change the
players’ Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf index by manipulating the quota. We then
proceed to quantify the worst case effects of this manipulation for all players. We
will be interested both in the ratios of the player’s powers for a given pair of quotas
and in their differences.
Example 1. Consider a weighted voting game G = [I;(1;2;3);3]. In this game,
the player 3 is pivotal to three coalitions (namely, f3g, f1;3g and f2;3g) and to
four permutations (namely, 312, 321, 132 and 231), so we have 3(G) = 3=4,
'3(G) = 2=3. Now change the quota to 1. in the resulting game G, player 3 is
only pivotal if it joins an empty coalition or appears ﬁrst in a permutation, so we
have 3(G) = 1=4, '3(G) = 1=3.
A natural bound on manipulator’s inﬂuence is the worst-case ratio between a
given player’s values of the index in the two games corresponding to two different
values of the quota. Unfortunately, as we will now show, this ratio can only be
bounded for the largest player; for all other players, it might be possible to turn
them into dummies. Hence, at least in some weighted voting games, the center can
change the agents’ power by more than a constant factor.
Theorem 2. Given a set of players I, jIj = n, there exists a weight vector w,
0 < w1    wn and q;q0  w(I) such that for i = 1;:::;n   1, we have
'i(q0) = i(q0) = 0, while 'i(q) 6= 0, i(q) 6= 0. On the other hand, for any w
such that 0 < w1    wn and any q;q0  w(I), we have 'n(q)='n(q0)  n,
n(q)=n(q0)  2n 1, and these bounds are tight.
Proof. Set w = (1;:::;1;n). In the game G = [I;w;1] all players have equal
power, so by symmetry we have 'i(1) = 1=n for i = 1;:::;n. Moreover, each
player is pivotal for exactly one coalition, so we have i(1) = 1=2n 1. On the
other hand, in the game G0 = [I;w;n], all the players except for the last one
are dummies, so their Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices are 0, and we have
'n(n) = 1, n(n) = 1. Hence, 'n(n)='n(1) = n, n(n)=n(1) = 2n 1.
To show that the ratio 'n(q0)='n(q) cannot exceed n, it is enough to note that
for any n-player weighted voting game G it holds that 1=n  'n(G)  1, where
5both inequalities follow from the fact that for any i, 1  i < n, 0  'i(G) 
'n(G) and
Pn
k=1 'k(G) = 1. Similarly, in any weighted voting game G we have
1=2n 1  n(G)  1, so the ratio n(q0)=n(q) cannot exceed 2n 1.
By considering the weight vector w = (1;2;4;:::;2n 1) and quotas q =
2k 1   1, k = 2;:::;n   1, we can show that the ratios 'i(q0)='i(q) cannot be
bounded by a constant even if it is required that 'i(q) 6= 0; we omit the details.
Since the previous approach yielded no meaningful bounds for the ﬁrst n  
1 players, we will now try to bound the worst-case difference between a given
player’s values in the corresponding games. We obtain tight bounds for this prob-
lem.
Theorem 3. For a set of players I, jIj = n, any weight vector w, 0 < w1 
  wn and any q;q0  w(I), for i = 1;:::;n   1 the difference 'i(q)   'i(q0)
can be at most 1=(n   i + 1) and this bound is tight. For player n, the difference
'n(q)   'n(q0) can be at most 1   1=n, and this bound is tight.
Proof. Set w = (1;2;4;:::;2n 1). In the game [I;w;2k], where k 2 f1;:::;n 
1g, the ﬁrst k players are dummies, and the last n   k players have equal power,
1=(n   k). Hence, for i = 1;:::;n   1, by changing the quota from 2i to 2i 1,
we change the Shapley–Shubik index of the ith player from 0 to 1=(n   i + 1),
as required. To see that this bound is tight, consider an arbitrary weight vector w0
that satisﬁes 0 < w0
1    w0
n, a player i, 1  i < n, and a quota q0  w0(I).
Naturally, 'i(I;w0;q)  0 and monotonicity of the Shapley–Shubik index implies
that for j > i we have 'i(I;w0;q)  'j(I;w0;q). As
Pn
k=i 'k(I;w0;q)  1, we
have 'i(I;w0;q)  1=(n   i + 1).
For player n and our weight vector w, changing the quota from 2n 1 to 1
changes n’s Shapley–Shubik index from 1 to 1=n, yielding the difference 1   1
n.
Since in any n-player voting game G we have 1
n  'n(G)  1, this gives a tight
bound for player n.
Theorem 4. For a set of players I, jIj = n, any weight vector w, 0 < w1 
  wn and any q;q0  w(I), for i = 1;:::;n   1 the difference i(q)   i(q0)
can be at most
  n i
b n i
2 c

 2i n and this bound is tight. For player n, we have
n(q)   n(q0)  1   1=2n 1 and this bound is tight.
Proof. Let us ﬁx a nonnegative integer i, i < n, let I = f1;:::;ng be a set of
players and let (1;:::;1 | {z }
i 1
;i;2i;:::;2i | {z }
n i
) be a vector of their weights. Set q = 2i 
bn i
2 c+i, and q0 = 2i. For quota q, agent i contributes to a coalition exactly if this
coalition contains bn i
2 c players of weight 2i and any number of players of weight
61. There are
  n i
b n i
2 c

 2i 1 such coalitions and thus i(q) =
  n i
b n i
2 c

 2i 1=2n 1.
Since i(q0) = 0, the difference i(q) i(q0) is
  n i
b n i
2 c

2i n. Now we prove that
this is also an upper bound on i(I;w;q) i(I;w;q0) for any n-player weighted
voting game and any two quotas, q and q0.
Let I = f1;:::;ng be a set of players and let w = (w1;:::;wn) be an arbi-
trary vector of their weights with w1    wn. Let q be a quota, 0 < q  w(I),
and let 1  i < n. We denote X = f1;:::;i   1g and Y = fi + 1;:::;ng. Let
S  2I be the set of all the coalitions that player i contributes to. Pick Z1;Z2 2 S
so that Z1 6= Z2 and Z1 \Y  Z2 \Y . We claim that Z1 \X 6= Z2 \X. Indeed,
suppose for contradiction that Z1 \ X = Z2 \ X. As Z1 6= Z2, it follows that
Z1 \ Y % Z2 \ Y , and since for all y 2 Y , wy  wi, we have q >
P
j2Z1 wj  P
j2Z2 wj + wi  q, a contradiction. We deﬁne a chain as a set of coalitions
fZ1;Z2;:::;Zlg  S s.t. Z1 \Y  Z2 \Y  :::  Zl \Y . We conclude that if
we divide S into chains then in each chain there will be at most 2jXj = 2i 1 coali-
tions. By Sperner Theorem, the number of chains is at most
  jY j
b
jY j
2 c

=
  n i
b n i
2 c

, and
hence jSj 
  n i
b n i
2 c

 2i 1. Therefore i(q) 
  n i
b n i
2 c

 2i n. On the other hand,
for any threshold q0, i(q0)  0, and hence i(q)   i(q0) 
  n i
b n i
2 c

 2i n.
Forplayern, we sawearlierthatforanyq (i.e., for anyq between1andthetotal
weight of all players) 1=2n 1  i(q)  1, and so n(q)   n(q0)  1   1=2n 1.
We also saw that this value is obtained with weight vector w = (1;:::;1;n) and
quotas q = n, q0 = 1.
4 Separating the Players
In the previous section we focused on the effects that a change of quota can have
on the value of the index for a single player, both in absolute and in relative terms.
These results are important in the situation where we are interested in the power
of that player, irrespective of the effects it may have on other players. Another
motivation for changing the quota could be affecting the relative power of two
players i and j. For instance, suppose that wi < wj, and the center prefers player
i to player j. From the monotonicity properties of both Shapley–Shubik index and
Banzhaf index, it follows that for any value of the quota q both 'i(q)  'j(q) and
i(q)  j(q). Hence, the best that the center may hope for is to ﬁnd the value
of the quota q that satisﬁes 'i(q) = 'j(q) (or i(q) = j(q)). Conversely, if the
center prefers player j to player i, it may try to choose the quota so that 'j(q)
is strictly greater than 'i(q) (respectively, j(q) is strictly greater than i(q)). In
what follows, we show that both of these tasks are easy to achieve.
7Before we present these proofs, note that by symmetry, if wi = wj, then
'i(q) = 'j(q) and i(q) = j(q). That is, if the weights of two players are
equal, changing the quota will not change the fact that their powers (under both
Shapley–Shubik index and Banzhaf index) are equal.
Theorem 5. Consider a set of players I = f1;:::;ng and a vector of weights
w = (w1;:::;wn) that satisﬁes w1    wn. For each player j there is a
quota value q such that for each player i with wi < wj it holds that 'i(q) < 'j(q)
and i(q) < j(q). Also, there is a quota value q0 such that for each two players i
and j it holds that 'i(q0) = 'j(q0) and i(q0) = j(q0).
Proof. To prove the ﬁrst part of the theorem, let us ﬁx a player j and a quota
q = wj. Consider any i with wi < wj and any permutation  in which i is
pivotal. It is easy to see that j is pivotal for the permutation 0 obtained from 
by transposing i and j (we have to consider two cases, namely, (i) < (j) and
(i) > (j), in both cases the statement is obvious). On the other hand, there are
also permutations where j is pivotal, but i would not be pivotal in a permutation
obtainedbytransposingj andi: justconsiderpermutationsthatstartwithj. Hence,
under the quota q = wj, the number of permutations where j is pivotal is strictly
greater than the number of permutations where i is pivotal and so 'j(q) > 'i(q).
The proof for the Banzhaf index is similar.
To prove the second part of the theorem, set q0 = w1. Then each player i
is pivotal for exactly (n   1)! permutations (the ones where he or she appears
ﬁrst), and to exactly one coalition (fig). Hence, the Shapley–Shubik indices of all
players, as well as their Banzhaf indices, are equal.
The center may also be interested in ﬁnding a quota that ensures that all players
have different Shapley–Shubik or Banzhaf indices. This choice can be motivated
by fairness, i.e., a desire that a player with a larger weight has strictly more inﬂu-
ence than a player with a smaller weight. Unfortunately, it turns out that this is not
always possible.
Deﬁnition6. Asequenceofpositivenumbers(w1;:::;wn)iscalledsuper-increasing
if for each 2  k  n, we have
Pk 1
j=1 wj < wk.
We will now prove that for any super-increasing weight vector of length at least
3, there is no separating quota.
First we need the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7. Given a weighted voting game G = [I;w;q], players i and j are
called interchangeable if for every permutation  on I such that i is pivotal for ,
transposing i and j makes j pivotal; and for every permutation  on I such that j
is pivotal, transposing i and j makes i pivotal.
8It is easy to see that if two players are interchangeable, then their Shapley–
Shubik indices, as well as their Banzhaf indices, are equal.
Lemma 8. For any game G = [I;w;q] with jIj  3 and a super-increasing
vector of weights w = (w1;:::;wn), it holds that either players 1 and 2 are
interchangeable, or players 2 and 3 are interchangeable.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the number of agents n. Let n = 3.
Consider a super-increasing sequence w = (w1;w2;w3). Suppose for contradic-
tion that there exists a quota q such that players 1 and 2 are not interchangeable,
and players 2 and 3 are not interchangeable. If q  w2 then 2 and 3 are inter-
changeable (to see this, it sufﬁces to check all the 6 permutations of the 3 players).
So q > w2. If q  w2 +w3 then 2 and 3 are interchangeable, and so q < w2 +w3.
If w1 + w3 < q < w2 + w3 then 2 and 3 are interchangeable, hence q  w1 + w3.
If w3 < q  w1 + w3 then 1 and 2 are interchangeable, and hence q  w3. If
w1+w2 < q  w3 then 1 and 2 are interchangeable (and dummy) ) q  w1+w2.
If w2 < q  w1 + w2 then 1 and 2 are interchangeable. And so for each q, either
players 1 and 2, or players 2 and 3 are interchangeable, a contradiction.
For the inductive step we assume that the claim is correct for n   1 and we
prove it for n. Let q be the quota value we consider, set I = f1;:::;ng, and a
super-increasing sequence w = (w1;:::;wn). Let G = [I;w;q] and let G0 be
identical to G except that G0 does not include player n. We will consider two
cases. First, let q  wn and let i and j be two interchangeable players in G0, such
that i = 1 and j = 2, or i = 2 and j = 3 (their existence is guaranteed by the
inductive assumption). It is easy to see that i and j are also interchangeable in G.
Let  be any permutation of I where i is pivotal. Since q  wn, it follows that
(n) > (i), and so if we transposed i and j in , j would be pivotal. The same
argument applies as well to any permutation where j is pivotal. Thus, it follows
that i and j are interchangeable in G.
Now let us handle the case when wn < qn 
Pn
i=1 wi. Since w is a super-
increasing sequence, for each set T  I such that
P
j2T wj  q it holds that
n 2 T. Let us deﬁne q00 = q   wn and let G00 be identical to G except that G00
does not include player n and G00 uses quota q00. By the inductive assumption we
know that there are two players in G00, i and j, such that i;j 2 f1;2;3g, i 6= j,
and i and j are interchangeable in G00. Let  be any permutation of I such that i is
pivotal under quota q. Let T be  with i and j transposed. We will show that j is
pivotal for T under quota q as well. Since i is pivotal in  under q, it must be that
n precedes i in . Let 00 and 00T be permutations obtained via deleting player
n from  and T, respectively. It follows that i is pivotal for 00 under quota q00.
Since i and j are interchangeable in G00, j is pivotal in 00T under q00. As a result, j
is pivotal in T under q. We can apply the same argument with the roles of i and j
9reversed, obtaining that i and j are interchangeable in G. This completes the proof
of the inductive step and of the whole lemma.
Lemma 8 immediately implies the following result.
Theorem 9. For any game G = [I;w;q] with jIj  3 and a super-increasing
vector of weights w = (w1;:::;wn), either '1(q) = '2(q) and 1(q) = 2(q), or
'2(q) = '3(q) and 2(q) = 3(q). Consequently, there is no separating quota for
w.
5 Setting the Quota: Algorithmic Results
In this section, we focus on computational complexity aspects of quota-related
problems. These issues are important from practical perspective, as in reality the
center may be computationally bounded, and therefore not able to use approaches
that require superpolynomial computation time. In what follows, we assume that,
unless speciﬁed otherwise, the players’ weights are given in binary. Hence, we are
interested in algorithms whose running time is polynomial in the number of players
n and the input description size logw(I).
The ﬁrst problem we will study is that of making a given player a dummy. This
is a very natural goal for a central authority that strongly dislikes a particular agent:
e.g., an election authority that wants to ensure that a particular extremist party has
no inﬂuence in the parliament. In what follows, we describe a polynomial-time
algorithm for this problem.
Deﬁnition10. Givenaweightvectorw = (w1;:::;wn)suchthat0 < w1  w2 
:::  wn and a weight w, we say that w is essential for w if for all 1  t  n, Pt 1
i=1 wi  wt   w.
The next theorem justiﬁes using the term essential in Deﬁnition 10: A player
whose weight is essential for the vector of weights of the remaining players is never
a dummy, irrespective of the choice of the quota value for the game.
Theorem 11. Let w = (w1;:::;wn) be a vector of weights such that 0 < w1 
w2  :::  wn. A weight w is essential for w if and only if there is no quota q, 0 <
q  w +
Pn
i=1 wi, such that n + 1 is a dummy in a game G(q) = [f1;:::;n;n +
1g;(w1;:::;wn;w);q].
Proof. Let w, w, and G be as in the statement of the theorem. We ﬁrst show that
if w is not essential for w then there is a quota q such that n + 1 is a dummy in
G(q). By Deﬁnition 10, if w is not essential then there is an integer t, 1  t  n,
such that w +
Pt 1
i=1 wi < wt. However, this means that a coalition is successful in
10G(wt) if and only if it contains at least one player from the set ft;t + 1;:::;ng.
Thus, adding player n + 1 to a coalition can never push it from being a losing one
to being a winning one and so n+1 is a dummy in G(wt). This completes the ﬁrst
part of the proof.
Let us now assume that w is essential for w. We will show that in this case
there is no quota q such that n + 1 is a dummy in G(q). We need to show that
the distance between the adjacent sums of subsets of fw1;:::;wng is no bigger
than w. Formally, we will prove that for all integers t, 1  t  n, for all x s.t.
0  x 
Pt
i=1 wi there exists x0 such that 0  x0 < w and x + x0 is a sum of
some subset of fw1;:::;wtg.
Our proof follows by induction on t. For the basis, t = 1, let x be a real number
such that 0  x  w1. If x = 0, deﬁne x0 = 0, and x + x0 = 0 is a sum of empty
subset of fw1g. If 0 < x  w1, deﬁne x0 = w1   x. Then 0  x0 < w, and
x + x0 = w1. For the inductive step we assume that the claim holds for some
integer t 1, and we show that this implies our claim for t. Let x be a real number
such that 0  x 
Pt
i=1 wi. We consider 3 cases:
1. If x  wt   w then, since w is essential for w, 0  x 
Pt 1
i=1 wi and from
the inductive assumption there exists 0  x0 < w s.t. x + x0 is a sum of
subset of w1;:::;wt 1.
2. If wt   w < x  wt, then set x0 = wt   x, and then 0  x0 < w and
x + x0 = wt.
3. If wt < x 
Pt
i=1 wi then 0 < x   wt 
Pt 1
i=1 wi, and by the inductive
assumption there exists x0, 0  x0 < w such that x   wt + x0 is a sum of
subset of w1;:::;wt 1, therefore x + x0 is a sum of subset of w1;:::;wt.
Thisshowsthatthedifferencebetweentwoadjacentsumsofsubsetsoffw1;:::;wng
is at most w. Since for any quota q, 0 < q  w +
Pn
i=1 wi, it holds that ; is a
losing coalition for G(q) and f1;:::;n +1g is a winning coalition for G(q), there
is at least one coalition for which n + 1 is pivotal.
Theorem 11 yields a simple algorithm for testing whether there exists a quota
making a speciﬁc agent a dummy player: indeed, it sufﬁces to check whether the
weight of that player is essential for the vector of the other players’ weights (sorted
in nondecreasing order), and this can be done using O(n) additions and compar-
isons. Moreover, using this algorithm, we can now easily check what is the quota
that minimizes the Banzhaf index of an agent.
Theorem 12. There exists a polynomial time algorithm that ﬁnds the value of the
quota which minimizes the Banzhaf index of a given player.
11Proof. Use the algorithm described above to check if there is a quota that makes
an agent a dummy player, and if so, return this quota. Otherwise, return quota
q = minfw1;:::;wng. Under q, the Banzhaf index of our agent is 1=2n 1, since
the only coalition it contributes to is the empty set.
6 Comparing Two Values of the Quota
In the previous section we showed that when the center can choose any quota that
he or she likes, some of the associated computational problems (e.g., minimizing
a player’s Banzhaf index) become easy. However, in real-life scenarios, the center
may be restricted in the choice of quota: For example, the center might be able to
modify the quota only very slightly or have a choice of only several quota values.
We will now show that the problem of deciding which of two given quotas favors a
particular player more is computationally hard, even if the quotas differ only by 1.
The notion of hardness that we will make use of is PP-hardness, which is
believed to be considerably stronger than NP-hardness: any PP-hard problem is
NP-hard, but not vice versa. We also show that this problem is in the class PP,
i.e., that it is PP-complete, thus pinpointing its exact complexity.
Deﬁnition 13. Let f be either the Shapley–Shubik index or the Banzhaf index.
In the Quotaf problem we are given a set of players I, jIj = n, a vector of
weights w = (w1;:::;wn), two quota values, q0 and q00, and an index i 2 I. Let
G0 = [I;w;q0], G00 = [I;w;q00]. The task is to decide whether fi(G0) > fi(G00).
The class PP (see, e.g., [16]) captures the notion of probabilistic polynomial-
time computation. The idea is that one can look at nondeterministic computations
in terms of a probabilistic ones: An NP machine (a nondeterministic polynomial-
time Turing machine) at each computation step tosses a coin to choose the next
move uniformly at random from the set of possible ones, as deﬁned by its transition
relation. Thus, we can naturally deﬁne the probability of an event that an NP
machine N accepts a string x. Formally, we say that a language L belongs to PP
if there exists an NP machine N such that: x 2 L if and only if the probability that
N accepts x is at least 1
2.
PP is a surprisingly powerful class. For example, NP  PP and, in fact, it
even holds that 
p
2  PP [5]. (
p
2 is the class of decision problems that can be
solved via parallel access to NP, also known as PNP[log].) Used as an oracle, PP
is essentially as powerful as #P [3]; in fact, #P can be viewed as a functional
counterpart of PP.
There are many natural PP-complete problems. In particular, [10] recently
studied the following one.
12Deﬁnition 14 ([10]). Let f be either the Shapley-Shubik index or the Banzhaf
index. Let PowerComparef problem be the following: Given two weighted voting
games, G0 and G00, a player i in G0, and a player j in G00, does it hold that fi(G0) >
fj(G00).
FaliszewskiandHemaspaandrashowthatthisproblemisPP-completebothfor
the Shapley-Shubik power index and for the Banzhaf power index. They do so via,
in effect, reducing from SAT-Compare, the problem that given two propositional
formulas, x and y, asks if #SAT(x) > #SAT(y), where #SAT(x) is the function
that takes as input a propositional formula x and returns the number of satisfying
truth assignments for x.
As Quotaf is a special case of PowerComparef, the result of [10] immediately
implies that Quotaf is in PP both for f = ' and f = . To show that Quotaf is
PP-hard, rather that using the result of [10] as a black box, we make use of a tech-
nical lemma proved in that paper, which provides a reduction from SAT-Compare
to SubsetSum-Compare that has several useful properties. (SubsetSum-Compare
is deﬁned similarly to SAT-Compare, i.e., it compares the number of solutions to
two instances of a classical NP-complete problem Subset Sum). We then show that
an instance of SubsetSum-Compare output by this reduction can be transformed
into an instance of Quotaf for f = ';, so that a “yes”-instance of the former
problem becomes a “yes”-instance of the latter problem and vice versa.
Our PP-completeness proofs makes use of a #P function #SubsetSum(X),
which is a function that takes as input a subset sum instance and returns the num-
ber of solutions to that instance. A subset sum instance is a sequence of nonneg-
ative integers [x1;:::;xm;tx] and a solution to such an instance is any subset of
fx1;:::;xmg that sums up to tx.
The following lemma is a corollary to the reduction used in [10].
Lemma 15. Given two propositional formulas, x and y, it is possible to compute
in polynomial time two instances of the subset sum problem, X = [x1;:::;xm;tx]
and Y = [y1;:::;ym;ty] such that #SubsetSum(X) = #SAT(x) and also
#SubsetSum(Y ) = #SAT(y). In addition there is a nonnegative integer k such
that: (1) any subset of fx1;:::;xmg that sums up to tx contains exactly k elements,
and (2) any sbset of fy1;:::;ymg that sums up to ty contains exactly k elements.
We are noe ready to prove our main result in this section.
Theorem 16. Quota' and Quota are PP-complete.
Proof. It is easy to see that Quota' 2 PP as it is a simple restriction of the
PowerCompare' problem.
13To show PP-hardness we give a reduction from SAT-Compare to Quota'.
Let us ﬁx two propositional formulas, x and y. Our reductions works as follows.
We ﬁrst compute the two subset sum instances, X = [x1;:::;xm;tx] and Y =
[y1;:::;ym;ty], as described in Lemma 15. Let K =
Pm
i=1 xi + tx + 1. Our
reduction outputs: A set of players I = f1;:::;2m + 1g, a sequence of weights
w = [1;x1;:::;xm;Ky1;:::;Kym], two quotas, q0 = tx + 1 and q00 = Kty + 1,
and an index i = 1 of the weight-1 player. We will refer to the weight-1 player as
p. Clearly, our reduction works in polynomial time. Let us now show correctness.
Let G0 = [I;w;q0] and let G00 = [I;w;q00]. We claim that '1(G0) > '1(G00) if
and only if #SubsetSum(X) > #SubsetSum(Y ), which is equivalent to testing
if #SAT(x) > #SAT(y).
Let us consider '1(G0). Any permutation  for which p is pivotal in the game
G0 has the property that the sum of the weights of all the players that precede p is
exactly q0   1 = tx. Thus, none of the players Ky1;:::;Kym can precede p and
it is easy to see (as pointed out by [7]) that
'1(G0) = k!(2m   k)!#SubsetSum(X) = k!(2m   k)!#SAT(x):
On the other hand, let us consider '1(G00). Let  be a permutation for which
p is pivotal in game G00. We claim that in such a permutation only players with
weights Ky1;:::;Kym can precede p. Let us assume that this is not the case and
that the total weight of the players with weights x1;:::xm that precede p is b > 0.
Naturally, b  K   1. Thus, the total weight of the players preceding p in  is
of the form Ka + b, where a is some nonnegative integer. However, p is pivotal
if and only if the total weight of the preceding players is q00   1 = Kty. This is
impossible if b 6= 0. Thus, any permutation  for which p is pivotal in G00 has the
property that p is preceded exactly by a subset of players fKy1;:::;Kymg whose
weights sum up to Kty. As a result, we have that
'1(G00) = k!(2m   k)!#SubsetSum(Y ) = k!(2m   k)!#SAT(y):
Weconcludethat'1(G0) > '1(G00)ifandonlyif#SubsetSum(X) > #SubsetSum(Y ).
Using a similar approach, we can show that our problem is also hard for the
Banzhaf power index.
One can strengthen Theorem 16 as follows.
Theorem 17. Quota' and Quota remain PP-complete even if we restrict them
to involve quotas that differ by 1.
The proof of Theorem 17 is much more involved than the proofs of the previous
results, and is therefore omitted.
14Discussion Our hardness results show that computational complexity can be a
barrier to manipulation by the central authority, as they imply that it will be difﬁcult
for the center to choose the quota so as to obtain the desired result. Moreover, as
PP is a more powerful complexity class than NP, and our problems are complete for
it, the manipulators will not be able to use the existing techniques for problems in
NP. However, PP-hardness does not necessarily imply that the problem is hard on
average; proving that manipulating the quota is hard in this sense is an interesting
open problem. Furthermore, even though power indices themselves are hard to
compute, a hardness of manipulation result is still signiﬁcant: power indices reﬂect
the distribution of power among the agents, and the center may want to manipulate
this distribution even if it cannot compute it.
On the ﬂip side, it is known [15] that both Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf in-
dex are easy to compute if the weights are polynomially bounded (or, equiva-
lently, given in unary). Clearly, these algorithms can be used to solve Quota'
and Quota, as we can directly compute the values of a player’s power index for
both quotas, and choose the quota that gives us a better outcome. Hence, compu-
tational complexity alone does not provide adequate protection from this form of
manipulation, and other approaches are needed.
7 Conclusion
We have considered quota control manipulations in weighted voting games, where
the central authority sets the game’s quota to suit its purposes. We have shown the
central authority can affect the agents’ power by choosing the proper quota, quanti-
ﬁed the possible effect of such manipulations, discussed the problem of equalizing
and unequalizing agents’ power and discussed the computational complexity of
ﬁnding the proper quota for various purposes. We gave a tractable procedure for
testing whether there exists a quota that makes a given player a dummy, and shown
that checking which of two possible quota values makes a certain agent more pow-
erful is PP-complete.
Severaldirectionsremainopenforfurtherresearch. Sincemanipulationsthrough
quota control are possible in weighted voting games, what measures can be taken
against such manipulations? Are there restricted domains where there is a polyno-
mial algorithm for checking which quota makes a certain agent more powerful than
another agent? Are there other interesting domains where such control manipula-
tions are possible? Are there other payoff division schemes that are more resistant
to such manipulations?
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